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Each society, at each moment, elaborates a body of social problems taken to be 
legitimate, worthy of being debated, of being made public and sometimes officialized 
and, in a sense, guaranteed by the state. 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 236) 
Paradoxes and conundrums 
Almost all studies of ‘sectarianism’ in Scotland point to a central ‘paradox’ or 
a ‘conundrum’ – that while there are widespread perceptions of a serious 
problem of sectarianism very few people have ever had any direct experience 
of it (Ormston, et al, 2015: 269).  Sectarianism is not something that ‘we’ do 
but something that other people do to other people in other places (Rosie, 
2015: 330). Metaphors abound to capture this elusive but apparently deep-
seated social problem. It is compared to glass bottles (problem of perception), 
glass ceiling (problem of discrimination), and a glass curtain (problem of 
exclusion) (Ormston, et al, 2015), or, alternatively, to a Cobweb (a problem 
with many gaps in-between) rather than a joined-up Patchwork (a societal-
wide problem) (Goodall, et al, 2015), or an iceberg where what you see above 
the surface is all that exists with no hidden depths of sectarianism submerged 
below (Bruce, 1988; Rosie, 2015). If there is, as much research demonstrates, ‘a 
considerable perception-reality gap when it comes to public understandings 
of sectarianism’ then the presumed threat posed to civility and public order 
can only present itself as ‘a subtle but intractable problem’ (Ormston, et al, 




This paradox is compounded by a conundrum - sectarian insiders and non-
sectarian outsiders appear to occupy completely different perceptual worlds. 
‘The public’, insofar as their views are known through opinion polls or 
attitude surveys, categorise some practices and groups as sectarian even 
though the groups classified in this way typically deny that their beliefs and 
rituals are sectarian in nature. Since some ‘find it difficult to even recognize’ 
that their attitudes are sectarian more robust research is needed so that ‘this 
enduring problem in Scottish life’ will be more widely perceived and 
discussed (Goodall,  et al, 2015: 293).  
 
For instance, while Orange and Republican marches and parades create 
anxiety within communities participants themselves deny that their intentions 
are sectarian in the least (Hamilton-Smith, et al, 2015: 325). Marches, parades 
or ‘processions’ appear provocative to the ‘community’ and the police, 
especially in areas of urban marginality and community stigmatization. Yet as 
Hamilton-Smith et al (2015) note, anxieties about sectarian processions may 
be related to much deeper, underlying issues. The more deprived that an area 
is then the greater the perception of sectarian prejudice and tensions will be.   
Ormston et al (2015: 277) also found that Catholics feel more harassed than 
other groups the more deprived the local area is, although even in the most 
deprived quintile only 17 percent of respondents felt threatened by parades.  
 
Despite these relatively low-level concerns, state authorities in Scotland 
nominated sectarianism as a fundamental social antagonism disfiguring the 
national community (Law, 2016). This was far from the opening of the process 
of governmental attempts to curtail sectarianism. During the 1980s through to 
the 2000s sectarianism had been elaborated, repeatedly and episodically, as a 
legitimate subject for public discourse, classification and state intervention. In 
3 
 
2005 a Government summit on sectarianism hailed by the Labour First 
Minister Jack McConnell as ‘historic’ led to the Scottish Executive’s 2006 
Strategy on Tackling Sectarianism in Scotland, which promoted the use of 
Football Banning Orders (FBOs) to exclude persistent offenders from football 
grounds.  
 
By 2011 this strategy appeared ineffective and insufficient to governmental 
authorities. Indeed, sectarian offences were under-represented in the issuing 
of FBOs, and even more serious sectarian and racist offences failed to result in 
FBOs being issued (Scottish Government Social Research, 2011: 14). It was 
only following sensational media coverage of a football game between ‘the 
Old Firm’ of the Glasgow clubs Celtic and Rangers, that sectarianism was 
nominated as an official crime. This is despite the fact that the term 
‘sectarianism’ itself is contested, subject to multiple interpretations and cannot 
be defined in Scots Law. With the passing of legislation, the Scottish 
Government committed a budget of £9 million to address sectarianism, about 
which a lot is said but not enough it seems is known.  
 
The gap between sectarian practices and sectarian perceptions is regularly 
compared to the well-known paradox of rising public fears of crime at a time 
when many forms of violent crime are actually falling. In the case of crime, 
popular misperceptions are routinely explained as the result of ideological 
constructions by ‘the media’ and government that stoke exaggerated moral 
panics (Cohen, 2011). In contrast, the role of the media and government in the 
construction of sectarianism has not been to the forefront of academic studies 
(see Kelly, 2011, for an exception). Instead, research concentrates on the 
supposedly decivilising aspects of bad behavior around football and parades, 
including contentious cultural paraphernalia – flags, songs, football colours, 
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marches – in an attempt to uncover the ‘tacit nature of sectarian sentiment’ 
(Goodall, et al, 2015: 297).  
 
Sociologically speaking, the afterlife of ‘sectarianism’ expresses definite social 
and political conditions that make possible both the lived experience of 
sectarianism, insofar as this can be divined, and the symbolic classification of 
sectarianism as an outdated mode of distinction. Sectarianism valorizes 
symbolic distinction and separation as prohibitions against social and 
ideological promiscuity and contamination between established and outsider 
groups (Weber, 1946). As with the religious field more strictly defined, every 
consensus of symbolic meaning serves the simultaneous classificatory 
function of vision and division, inclusion and exclusion, integration and 
differentiation (Bourdieu, 1991). Symbolic capital that only recently sanctified 
a relatively privileged position in the social field, such as Protestant 
Unionism, can find itself devalued, despite relatively unchanged ideological 
content, by the valorisation of emerging and increasingly dominant forms of 
symbolic capital as represented by the ‘civil religion’ of sub-state nationalism.  
 
This chapter attempts to situate the moral panic around sectarianism in wider 
relations of social power. A civilising offensive is mobilised by the legitimate 
sources of symbolic nomination to regulate and discipline de-civilised 
outsiders. This is experienced differently as resentment and ressentiment, 
depending on where groups are distributed in social space. On the one hand, 
the sources of legitimate symbolic power experience ressentiment as a chronic 
maladaptation of outsider groups to the civilising canopy of the national 
habitus. On the other hand, the de-civilised sources of illegitimate symbolic 
power experience resentment as relatively short-lived losses of control 
associated with football rivalries.  Indeed, fierce sporting rivalries may 
provide a controlled example of how collective effervescence and cathartic 
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release may help to lower the threat to group integrity posed by other groups 
and foster greater symbolic equality in a game of more or less evenly-matched 
sides (Elias, 2008: 231).  
 
Dominant and dominated sectarianism 
With little evidence of public disorder or inter-communal violence, the social 
power of media and political nomination classify football, flags, songs, 
parades and marches as contentious, provocative and a grave sectarian threat 
to the social fabric. Such powers of nomination and classification rest on the 
accumulated force of a centralised apparatus able to separate legitimate from 
illegitimate forms of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2014: 273).  
 
Naming processes are always prescriptive and descriptive, bringing into the 
field of perception what it asserts already exists objectively in any case. 
Processes of legitimate nomination, such as that concerning sectarianism, 
often reify and enclose groups as self-contained phenomenon with little 
connection to wider processes of nation and state formation. As Bourdieu 
(1991: 122) argued, ‘All social destinies, positive or negative, by concentration 
or stigma, are equally fatal – by which I mean mortal – because they enclose 
those whom they characterise within the limits that are assigned to them and 
that they are made to recognise’. By enclosing groups into determinate 
categories of legitimate-civilised and illegitimate-decivilised, authorised 
nomination reifies the symbolic conditions for a double-bind cycle of de-
civilised sectarian violence. 
 
Against the prevailing academic consensus that sectarianism was only ever a 
marginal problem and that football provides a safety valve for social tensions, 
Tom Gallagher (1987: 1) warned in the 1980s that football rivalry acts as an 
incubator of religio-political bigotry that threatens to expose the fragile nature 
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of the civilising process:  ‘The enmity and hysteria sometimes on display at 
Old Firm matches can serve as a timely reminder of just how thin the crust of 
civilisation is’. Indeed, football-related sectarianism expresses what is 
repressed routinely. As such, pleasure can be taken from group 
transgressions, forever threatening a return of the repressed. As Billig (2002: 
185) argued about bigotry more generally: 
 
What is socially forbidden can become an object of desire and pleasure. 
If there are taboos on the expression of bigotry in contemporary 
society, outward prejudice may take the form of a forbidden pleasure. 
Bigotry, then, becomes a temptation.  
 
This was evident when the transformation of moral values in the 1960s and 
since coincided with the escalation of state and paramilitary violence in 
Northern Ireland. Sections of the Rangers’ support succumbed to the sectarian 
temptation, taking pleasure in virulent anti-Catholic denigration and 
indulged in a culture of alcohol-fuelled fan violence leading to major crowd 
disorders throughout the late 1960s to the 1980s. Scotland remains one of the 
few countries where public declarations of Irish heritage, such as St Patrick’s 
Day, the anniversary of the 1916 Easter Rising, or the flying of the Irish 
tricolour on a public building, can result in intimidation and threats from 
small groups of Loyalist fundamentalists.  
 
Yet the sectarianism of the dominated waxes and wanes in emotional 
intensity, physical threat and ideological rancour. By the 1980s anti-Catholic 
bigotry was already in slow decline.  This centrifugal process has been 
assisted by the development of a national habitus in Scotland that has shed 
much of the Unionist ideological legacy. The more insecure that an 
established group like Protestant Unionism feels the more that they tend to be 
unrelenting and dogmatic about the inferiority of the outsider group and the 
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supreme value of the established group (Elias, 2008: 230). Conversely, the 
more secure that a group feels of its own value the more that they can afford 
to adopt a more detached and accommodating relationship to outsiders.  
 
Although sectarianism is often treated as if it represented an unchanging 
symbolic monolithic, it operated as a mode of justification in different ways at 
different times and places. On one side, the ‘dominant sectarianism’ of the 
dominant classes in Scotland asserted their right to dominate through the 
ideological privileges conferred by sectarian exclusions and superiority over 
groups classified as ‘Irish Roman Catholic’. On the other side, the ‘dominated 
sectarianism’ of the dominated classes tended, as Bourdieu (1991: 19) notes of 
the religious field more generally, ‘to impose on the dominated a recognition 
of the legitimacy of the domination and of the symbolic modes of expression 
of this domination (that is, the lifestyle and religiosity of the dominant 
classes)’.  The same symbolic content of sectarianism therefore must perform 
different functions if it is to mediate quite distinct, even contrary social 
conditions.  
 
What is classified from above as ‘sectarian’ refers to beliefs and practices that 
once functioned as symbolic justification for reproducing unequal relations of 
power between supposedly cohesive ‘communities’. Yet the material and 
ideological sources of sectarianism in nineteenth century Scotland has been 
continually modified as a mode of justification as the social structure itself 
changed historically. Its residue functions today as an unwanted reminder of 
the accumulated history in the development of the national habitus in 
Scotland. 
 
Moral indignation and sectarianism 
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In 2011 the legitimate forms of symbolic domination in the political field in 
Scotland – journalists, police, politicians, academics – converged at a single 
point: something needed to be done about sectarianism. This concentration of 
symbolic power produced a self-sustaining escalation process of symbolic 
amplification often associated with moral panics (Cohen, 2011). Even before 
the controversial Old Firm game took place in early March 2011 the Scottish 
Police Federation had called for a ban on the fixture. On the day after the 
game Strathclyde Police Chief Stephen House called on the First Minister 
Alex Salmond and the Scottish government to organise a Summit between the 
police, the Scottish Football Association and the Old Firm to address violent 
disorder at and around the Glasgow football rivalry. Football-related disorder 
was debated in the Scottish Parliament. In the end, a six-point plan was 
agreed at the Summit to control the fixture. This was envisaged by the SNP 
First Minister Alex Salmond as ‘not the end of a process but very much the 
beginning of a series of actions’. Legislation was hastily enacted in 2012, the 
Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) 
Act, specifically targeting football rivalries as the source of decivilised 
attitudes, symbols and conduct afflicting Scottish society. Subsequently, 
academic research was commissioned and experts appointed to provide the 
legitimate authority of scholarly capital for the new regime of punishment 
and reform. 
 
Such concentrations of symbolic domination demonstrate that a simple 
opposition between the devolved state and Scottish civil society is untenable. 
Instead, as Bourdieu (2014: 36) argues, there is ‘a continuous distribution of 
access to the collective, public, material or symbolic resources with which the 
term “state” is associated with’. One of the functions of the symbolic 
continuum is to perform the alchemy of transforming particular interests into 
universal disinterest.  In this case, the classification and punishment of 
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subjects as sectarian must appear as an act of universal disinterest, in the 
name of the public good, above all particular points in social space.  
 
Performing the alchemy of disinterested punishment is a central feature of 
what sociologists and philosophers have called ‘ressentiment’. Ressentiment can 
be distinguished from the English word ‘resentment’. Resentment refers to a 
transitory emotional response to symbolic insult, offence, humiliation, and 
frustration in a situation of social interaction (Meltzer and Musolf, 2002). By 
outwardly displaying resentful displeasure resentment is an active form of 
retaliation, as in fierce sports rivalries, at least for a time until the emotional 
injury passes, in football rivalries typically in the hours after the end of the 
contest. Ressentiment, on the other hand, refers to a generalised, long drawn 
out and passive desire for retribution against a perceived, often abstract moral 
injury to the social body that resists redress. Revenge in such cases is 
constantly postponed since it is checked or restrained on a more or less 
permanent basis by external social constraints, leading to a feeling of 
powerlessness that can only be addressed by imaginary or symbolic violence.  
 
Nietzsche (1996) attributed the social sources of ressentiment to the sublimated 
emotions of ‘slave morality’ found in Judeo-Christianity and socialism. 
Unable to strike at the oppressor, Nietzsche argued, the slave morality 
transformed objective powerlessness into subjective strength by valorising 
humility, patience, empathy, restraint and mercy. Nietzsche’s anthropological 
speculations were given some sociological foundation by Max Scheler (1972) 
and Svend Ranulf (1964). In contrast to Nietzsche, Scheler (1972: 50) located 
ressentiment processes within the structure of a society where ‘equal rights 
(political and otherwise) or formal social equality, publicly recognised, go 
hand in hand with wide factual differences in power, property and 
education’. An unrelieved tension between formal equality and power 
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inequalities characterises the devalued position felt by the dominated 
fractions of the dominant class. Such tensions may be released through 
illusory valuations and ‘an urge to scold’ that is both attracted to and repelled 
by the denigrated object. ‘In ressentiment one condemns what one secretly 
craves; in rebellion one condemns the craving itself’ (Merton, 1968: 210). Yet 
the repressed always manages to return to the field of perception of the 
ressentiment attitude, whose re-appearance discloses ‘a silent, unadmitted 
“reproach”’ (Scheler, 1972: 76). Only an inversion of values, turning pleasure 
into restraint and punishment into reform, delivers ressentiment from the 
desire for an impossible revenge. ‘When the reversal of values comes to 
dominate accepted morality and is invested with the power of the ruling 
ethos, it is transmitted by tradition, suggestion and education to those that are 
endowed with the seemingly devalued qualities’ (Scheler, 1972: 77).  
 
Ranulf (1964) further argues that ressentiment restructures what are 
specifically middle class dispositions and perceptions. A disposition for moral 
indignation and disinterested punishment, Ranulf argues, exists for middle 
class groups compelled to exercise a high degree of self-control and outward 
restraint in contrast to outsider groups relieved of the same need to constantly 
sublimate the emotions. Outsider groups that enjoy the freedom to transgress 
the symbolic order invite the ‘repressed desires’ of a hostile middle class 
compelled to serve. Only those aspects of middle class experience are selected 
that justify imposing the ressentiment pattern of feeling onto the world as a 
disinterested form of punishment.  
 
Moral indignation is ‘the emotion behind the disinterested tendency to inflict 
punishment’, a pattern of punishment that has no direct benefit or 
gratification for the moraliser (Ranulf, 1964: 1). Official ressentiment over 
sectarianism is strikingly evident in the moral indignation displayed by 
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politicians, police, jurists and journalists, even academics. Such groups 
exercise the monopoly power of nomination and classification that separates 
legitimate from illegitimate forms of symbolic capital as part of what might be 
termed ‘a civilizing offensive’. 
 
As we have already seen, it is not difficult to come across the moral 
indignation of journalists, senior police officers and politicians. Even 
disinterested legal opinion is required to give expression to ressentiment. 
Moral indignation finds support for its transvaluation of values in a vague 
and elastic conception of offensiveness. As the Lord Advocate’s (2012) 
guidelines on the Offensive Behaviour at Football And Threatening 
Communications (Scotland) Act note, the offence refers to behaviour 
motivated by religious or other hatred, including behaviour that any 
‘reasonable person would be likely to find offensive’ or could incite public 
disorder. As Ranulf argued, the disinterested right to punish depends on 
moral indignation of an injured but reasonable person or group offended by 
symbolic violence. In this case, disinterested punishment relies on the the 
judgement of a police officer as ‘the reasonable person’ present at the time of 
the offence. Here the context needs to be perceived as ‘threatening’ or 
‘offensive’ and songs and chants interpreted as motivated by hatred on racial, 
religious, cultural or social grounds, or by hatred of a group, support for 
terrorist organizations, or the mocking or celebration of ‘the loss of life or 
serious injury’.  
 
Within the symbolic continuum, the least dominated fraction exercise more 
autonomy than more dominated fractions, enabling politicians to draw 
selectively on the rigorous findings of scholarly research produced to inform 
criminal justice policies. Government-funded research into sectarianism has 
amply demonstrated the absence of bounded sectarian communities or the 
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religious basis of sectarianism, yet politicians and media persist in mobilizing 
such discredited formulae.  
As part of the dominant fraction of the governing class, the Minister for 
Community Safety and Legal Affairs, Paul Wheelhouse, claimed in his 
foreword to the Scottish Government 2015 report on the effectiveness of the 
Offensive Behaviour at Football And Threatening Communications Act that it 
is ‘a step on Scotland’s journey to building a better nation’: 
 
singing, chanting and shouting of racial and sectarian comments acts 
as a way of normalizing derogatory attitudes and souring relationships 
or inflaming existing, strained relationships within or between 
Scotland’s communities … [The Act] was designed to send out a clear 
message to those who let their passion and pride become violent and 
offensive (Scottish Government, 2015: 3).  
 
Here the danger to Scotland as a civilized nation is one of (legitimate) 
sporting passions getting out of control and inciting widespread social 
disorder and physical violence. While there is evidence of episodic drink-
fuelled, physical violence associated with football rivalries, its relatively rare 
occurrence compels moral indignation into a fascination with symbolic 
violence.  
 
Symbolic violence is a problem for disinterested punishment, the Minister 
claims, because it risks escalating conflict between Scotland’s ‘communities’, 
supposedly already under strain. Here, as elsewhere, ‘community’ functions 
as a magical word, implying self-contained, discrete boundaries between rival 
groups that endanger the overriding unity of the national community. 
Disinterested punishment is therefore necessary to avenge unnecessary 




Finally, moral indignation conflates racism with sectarianism in a charged 
semantic slippage. Since racism is officially illegitimate, the coupling extends 
the elastic semantics of sectarianism. This includes outlawing symbolic 
support for ‘terrorists’ and political anti-state violence, which has no 
necessary relationship to racism. A further claim is made for the 
transvaluation of values that turns punishment into reform. Here it is claimed 
that the Act has had a ‘positive impact’ and made ‘real improvements’, even 
though the academic evaluation of the effectiveness of the Act was much 
more circumspect and noted the difficulty of disentangling secular trends 
towards self-restraint from any specific improvement arising from the 
implementation of the legislation.  
 
Sectarianism therefore becomes an all-encompassing term that includes any 
political, religious or cultural symbols or conduct that may be found offensive 
from the point of view of disinterested, self-restrained servants of the public. 
Academics share the moral indignation of governmental authority, indeed 
praise it where it furthers the needs of scholarship. As one government-
funded study argued, a clear need was identified for ‘nuanced scholarship 
that assists the Scottish Government ambitions of eradicating sectarianism in 
Scottish society. We note also the positive benefits of the recent Scottish 
Government programme of publicly-funded research’ (Goodall, et al, 2015: 
302).  
 
Without increased public discourse around sectarianism academics warn that 
the negative impact on individuals ‘may be more severe’ (Goodall, et al: 2015: 
299). Public policy and criminal justice approaches to sectarianism need to be 
‘informed by an accurate understanding of the attitudes of the Scottish public 
as a whole, as well as those of key sub-sections of society’ (Ormston, et al, 
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2015: 268). Similarly, and despite the paltry evidence of sectarian practices 
beyond low-level disruptive and derogatory conduct, a leading expert on 
sectarianism mobilises the ressentiment conviction that there needs to be ‘a 
sea-change in attitudes on what is and what is not acceptable in everyday 
Scottish life’ (Rosie, 2015: 334). In such cases, the normative stipulations of 
disinterested academic research run the risk of functioning as an echo 
chamber to legitimate political and media demands for a civilizing offensive. 
 
A further example of moral indignation emerges from the restrained 
discursive style adopted by the Scottish Government’s Advisory Group of 
academic experts. Sectarianism is defined by the government experts in the 
catch-all terms of religion, nationalism, politics and football: 
 
Sectarianism in Scotland is a complex of perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, 
actions and structures, at personal and communal levels, which 
originate in religious difference and can involve a negative mixing of 
religion with politics, sporting allegiance and national identifications. It 
arises from a distorted expression of identity and belonging. It is 
expressed in destructive patterns of relating which segregate, exclude, 
discriminate against or are violent towards a specified religious other 
with significant personal and social consequences. (Advisory Group, 
2013: 3.9, emphasis added) 
 
For disinterested nomination sectarianism is the ‘distorted’ and ‘destructive’ 
expression of hostile relations in a violent segregation of ‘them’ and ‘us’. This 
cannot be reduced to anti-Catholic or anti-Irish discrimination alone since the 
Catholic or Irish ‘us’ may feel ‘destructive’ enmity to the Protestant or British 
‘them’. By enshrining an equality of group prejudice each side is able to claim 
to be victims of sectarianism in the face of real or imagined humiliation by an 
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apparently more privileged outsider group. In the process, power imbalances 
are overlooked. For instance, despite an extremely unequal public presence of 
Loyalist marches (773) compared to Republican ones (41) in 2012 (Hamilton-
Smith et al, 2015: 310), both were seen as problems of equal magnitude and 
lumped together under the common nomination ‘sectarian’. Research also 
reports a higher, though not by a great deal, incidence of perceived anti-
Catholic prejudice and discrimination than anti-Protestant prejudice in 
Scotland (Ormston, et al, 2015).  
 
Such prejudice as exists tends to register as a more general cultural feeling 
than taking a more concrete form like employment discrimination or 
harassment. A spectrum of sectarian attitudes can be plotted on both sides of 
the divide from ‘hard-bitter’ to ‘soft-banter’ on an ascending scale of 
prejudice, bigotry and hatred, making the classification of behavior as 
sectarian dependent on the context of communication regardless of historical 
and ideological content. Therefore, despite its historical roots in anti-Irish 
Catholic hostility and discrimination, sectarianism in this definition persists in 
Scotland as an equality of group hatred requiring disinterested punishment. 
No distinction need be made between the historically formed position of a 
formerly dominated outsider group and a formerly dominant established 
group. Disinterested experts appear indifferent to the ideological meaning of 
symbols, only that they give illegitimate offence to the national habitus.  
 
The uses of sectarianism 
A governmental nexus of legitimate nomination and classification imposes 
moral indignation and disinterested reform and punishment on devalued 
‘sectarian’ symbols and subjects. Illegitimate physical and symbolic violence 
are bundled together by governmental authorities as part of what has been 
termed a civilising offensive. The idea of a civilising offensive is indebted to 
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Norbert Elias’ (2012) theory of civilising processes. As public space is pacified 
by the state monopoly of violence and taxation, personal and inter-personal 
life becomes more interdependent, less violent, more restrained and 
predictable within an unplanned and long-term process. With the loosening 
obligations of family and occupational bonds group relations increasingly 
take on the character of voluntary forms of association rather than an 
inescapable fate. This gives rise to a more self-conscious, less emotionally-
charged and less spontaneous form of social habitus. 
 
The conceptual development of a civilising offensive was shaped initially by 
Dutch sociologists to refer to self-conscious, planned and short-term reforms 
that aim to improve what powerful groups see as ‘barbaric practices’ of lower 
classes (Powell, 2013). As Kitty Verrips (1987: 3) put it: 
 
The term ‘civilizing offensive’ is used by Dutch sociologists and 
historians to refer to a wide range of phenomena, from nineteenth-
century bourgeois efforts to elevate the lower classes out of their 
poverty and ignorance and convince them of the importance of 
domesticity and a life of virtue, to the oppression of popular culture in 
early modern times and, in general, ‘the attack on behaviour presumed 
to be immoral or uncivilized’.  
 
Civilising offensives are closely related to the ressentiment attitude produced 
by the unrelieved tensions of middle class restraint. In his survey of the 
concept, Ryan Powell (2013) argues that civilizing offensives seem to succeed 
in modifying group conduct and perceptions when they are pushing at an 
open door, that is when they function as part of a process where the pattern of 
relations are already moving in the desired direction, which the civilising 




With increasingly non-violent social relations and increased pressures of self-
restraint ressentiment is also able to fester over protracted periods of time as 
the unreason of reasonable people. Ressentiment fears of sectarian violence 
demand recourse to the disinterested punishment of football supporters in a 
context where rates of non-sexual violent crime fell to their lowest level for 40 
years (Scottish Government, 2015b: 19). Violent crime rates in Scotland had 
been increasing for a long period from the 1970s to 1980s, plateaued during 
the 1990s, before entering a downward trend in the early 2000s, since when it 
decreased sharply by around 60%. Little of the remaining violence in society 
is classified as sectarian, despite the semantic elasticity of the term and the 
perpetual cycle of media publicity, political campaigns and supportive 
scholarship. In the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey of 2012/13 (Scottish 
Government, 2014: 68), of the intimidation and harassment reported by 
respondents less than 5 percent was said to be motivated by ‘sectarianism’, 
and even fewer were worried about the threat of sectarianism compared to 
the chances of random assault or gang-related violence.  
 
It appears that as the real risk of physical violence declines, sensitivity 
increases towards other, more symbolic ‘crimes’ requiring the disinterested 
punishment demanded by a renewed civilising offensive. In a Scottish 
context, Flint and Powell (2013) situate governmental attempts to curb 
sectarianism as a civilising offensive within the wider context of the 
‘civilising’ of football spectatorship in the UK in order to address perceived 
crises of incivility and urban disorder within disorderly public spaces. 
Largely symbolic rivalries of football offer a convenient displacement activity 
to legitimate governmental civilizing offensives (Waiton, 2013). Civilising 
offensives open with moral panics shaped by a governmental media offensive 
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to shift illegitimate violence, physical and symbolic, behind the scenes of 
social life.  
 
Public alarm over sectarianism, insofar as it is uncovered by social attitude 
surveys, responds to journalistic coverage of and political comment on 
football rivalry rather than a simple reflection of pre-existing structural or 
institutional processes. Football is therefore typically seen as the main source 
of sectarianism, especially among younger people, with Orange Order 
marches a distant second as a contributing factor. Moreover, survey 
respondents who perceive sectarianism to be widespread put its causes down 
to a broader range of factors than football alone, including social media and 
the politics of Ireland (Ormston et al, 2015: 281-4).  
 
Football affiliations crystallize long-run historical processes in Scotland, 
particularly the rivalry between the Glasgow clubs, Celtic and Rangers. One 
team, Celtic, is associated with a historically suspect, outsider minority 
religion, Roman Catholicism, and a despised foreign nationality, Irish. 
Glasgow Rangers, on the other hand, for a long time represented the 
establishment group in Scotland. As a symbol of Protestantism and Scottish 
Unionism Rangers refused to employ Roman Catholics, a sectarian practice 
that was abandoned in the 1980s. Celtic traditionally signed players of all 
denominations. From the 1890s, middle class directors of the club pursued 
sporting success at all costs. Modernizers put the club on a professional basis 
and established a profit-driven, private limited company, something that 
traditionalists saw as a betrayal of Celtic’s founding community-based, 
charitable ideals. Modernization of the club also enabled middle class leaders 
of the Irish Catholic community to integrate into the wider sports, legal and 
business establishment in Scotland, even as they remained committed to a 




 ‘Sectarianism’ became a public order matter limited to and given expression 
by football tribalism. Yet the tensions excited by intense club rivalries provide 
football with its specific function as a temporary rupture with the mundane 
routines and constraints of daily life. Elias and Dunning (2008) describe public 
rehearsals of symbolic rivalries and the oscillating tension-balance of football 
as a ‘controlled de-controlling of emotions’. Football has a cathartic effect that 
permits under controlled conditions what the dull routines of everyday life 
forbid. 
 
Moral indignation over football hostilities is merely one aspect of a broader 
governmental-media civilising offensive to legitimate welfare and criminal 
justice policies in the UK, with particular symbolic and material denigration 
reserved for sections of the dispossessed working class under conditions of 
urban marginality (Rodger, 2008). Media representations of poverty in 
Scotland wed neighbourhood decay and poor cultural taste to bestial gangs, 
knife crime and territorial violence in disdainful discourses about ‘Neds’ and 
urban working class areas in contrast to the civilized national habitus 
routinely affirmed by all reasonable people (Law and Mooney, 2011).  
 
As such, the civilising offensive follows a general pattern of media escalation 
and de-intensification over time. Before the 1990s newspaper reports about 
‘Neds’ were almost non-existent and only began to increase in frequency after 
1999, spiked in the early 2000s, followed by a rather erratic decline, albeit 
without returning to its pre-1990s level (Law and Mooney, 2011: 118). 
‘Sectarianism’ shares a similar pattern of media escalation and de-
intensification. In his analysis of major national newspaper titles in Scotland, 
Waiton (2016) demonstrates that there was a gradual but limited increase in 
the frequency of the use of the term ‘sectarianism’ during the 1990s, from an 
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almost complete absence in 1992, peaking ten years later with the public 
debate about ‘Scotland’s shame’ (almost 300 references to sectarianism), 
falling away again by 2009, before re-emerging with a vengeance as a 
heightened national discourse in 2011 (350 references). 
 
With the cyclical emergence of sectarianism as simultaneously a media, legal 
and political narrative, fears of an urban underclass of gangs and Neds were 
overlaid with the resurrection of another time-honoured bogeyman: the fear 
of wider quasi-religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics in 
Scotland. Yet much research demonstrates a weak or non-existent relationship 
between religious belief and structural discrimination in Scotland. Moreover, 
religious observance and church attendance are in terminal decline. Data 
show that young people are less and less religious than previous generations, 
resulting in a calamitous decline in Church of Scotland attendance since 1999 
from 35% to 18% (2013) – ‘nothing short of a collapse amongst all but the 
oldest category’ (Rosie, 2015: 338).  
 
Despite the chasm between religious practice and sectarian relationships they 
continue to be treated as synonymous or inter-related categories that rise and 
fall together. Religion is now often seen as a matter of the private beliefs of 
individuals rather than a shared ethos structuring an entire way of life for the 
community. Protestantism had of course been central to the development of 
the national habitus in Scotland – from the Protestant Unionism of the 
Reformation in 1560, the Union of the Crowns of 1603, and the Union of 
Parliaments if 1707. While the process of British state formation preserved the 
position of the Kirk, since the 1970s the established power advantage 
conferred by Protestant Unionism has dissolved in the acid of a specifically 




Traditionally, sectarianism referred to exclusionary relations between 
relatively coherent social groups defined by religion and ethnicity (Weber, 
1946). Such dense moral cohesion of self-regulating sectarian groups no 
longer characterises contemporary Scotland. More than 80 percent of 
Catholics claim one or more close Protestant friends while 76 percent of 
Protestants claim close Catholic friends. Only a tiny percent from each 
category do not know anyone from the other group (Ormston, et al, 2015: 279-
80). Social proximity also results in a stronger perception among non-
Catholics that Catholics are more likely to experience direct forms of 
discrimination. The material and moral universe that once gave meaning to 
sectarianism as a practice to maintain group ‘purity’ against outsider 
contamination has all but disappeared in Scotland. Long-run processes of 
secularization have weakened the moral authority of religious sects and 
churches as markers of group cohesion. As a result, intra-Christian religious 
antagonism is nowhere as virulent or widespread as it was once assumed to 
be.  
 
A slow accumulation of economic, cultural and social capital prepared the 
conditions for the colonization of middle class professions by upwardly-
mobile sons and daughters of Catholic manual workers (Paterson, 2000). As 
Boyle (2011: 213) argues ‘there is a significant body of evidence that the Irish 
Catholic community has enjoyed an intergenerational rise to prominence, 
wealth, and economic parity. In many respects, many migrants and 
descendents have risen to form part of a confident and assertive Irish Catholic 
middle-class community in Scotland’. Publicly-funded Catholic schools 
appear to have played a key role in mitigating occupational exclusion, 
particularly since the 1960s as employment in Scotland increasingly relied on 
credentials rather than less formal familial or associational structures. The 
social alchemy of turning socio-economic dispossession into one of cultural 
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possession is ambiguously experienced as one of social integration and group 
difference within the national habitus.  
 
While much of the research on life chances for Catholics show that Scotland 
has become increasingly meritocratic over the past half century, they are still 
more likely than their Protestant counterparts to live in deprived areas, to rent 
their homes, to suffer poorer health, to be the victims of crime, and to 
experience imprisonment, and exhibit significantly lower than average mental 
and physical wellbeing. Around 60% of Roman Catholics live in Glasgow and 
Clyde valley area, which also contains 70% of the 15% most deprived areas in 
Scotland. Partly, this is explicable in terms of the legacy of the historic 
multiple disadvantages and discrimination towards Irish Catholic 
descendants from nineteenth century waves of immigration to the erosion of 
the industrial base and the rise of the welfare state after 1945.  
 
What this points to is a change in the power-balance between previously 
dominant and dominated groups in a situation of increasingly fluid group 
boundaries (Elias and Scotston, 2008). Roman Catholics in Scotland were 
viewed as a suspect community by the established Protestant group through 
the construction of negative images of the Roman Catholic church or the 
paramilitary politics of Irish republicanism, as well as all sorts of imagined 
barbarous group practices such as idleness, ignorance, criminality, 
alcoholism, promiscuity, and so on. Immigrants excluded in such ways from 
the we-relation of the established national group may look to the state as a 
survival unit for protection and shelter. In the case of Catholics in Scotland, 
the right to publicly-funded denominational schools was granted by the 
Education Act of 1918, in the process helping consolidate the we-feeling of 
group difference, not only as a bulwark against collective inferiority but also 
as a mechanism of social integration into the wider British state-society (Finn, 
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2003), a process consolidated a generation later with the setting up of the 
welfare state.  
 
On the other hand, the long-established social habitus of Protestant Unionism 
no longer maps effortlessly to the post-imperial national habitus of modern 
Scotland. Identifying with the trappings of an imperialist British ruling class 
and the Orange Order meant that even poor Protestants could feel themselves 
emotionally superior to Catholics in Scotland. Protestant workers may 
therefore have felt ‘compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological 
wage’, as W.E.B. du Bois (1992: 700) said of poor whites in the South, while 
Catholics were despised as social inferiors. However, the sectarian separation 
between established Protestants and Catholic outsiders in nineteenth and 
twentieth century Scotland was never as absolute, systematic or murderous as 
the inter-racial system in the US. The prospects for a rigid sectarian divide 
akin to the deadly racist divide between poor whites and poor blacks in the 
southern states of the US was tempered by complex social inter-dependencies 
and struggles for working class solidarity in the industrial centres of Scotland.  
 
Changing power balances in context 
It is insufficient to plot an ascending continuum between all forms of 
antagonistic established-outsider relations as the eternal underlying 
conditions that make mass violence possible. Instead, it is necessary to locate 
the power ratio between groups within the specific character of the state 
formation process, conditions of crisis, and the national habitus. In its most 
extreme forms, feelings of group humiliation, decline, and victimhood can in 
conditions of state crisis give rise to mass redemptive violence and fascist 
movements (Paxton, 2005). An essential precondition for mass violence is a 
thoroughgoing process of ideological compartmentalization of social, spatial, 
institutional and psychological group isolation and dis-identification (de 
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Swaan, 2015). Alongside this, the state formation process plays a vital role in 
the escalation of violence. So while all states contain political, ethnic or 
religious categories that do not fit seamlessly into the dominant self-images of 
the nation, they only lead to mass violence in conditions where the state 
monopoly of violence is suspended or becomes instrumental in turning 
dormant identifications into deadly ‘killing compartments’.  
 
Moreover, the decivilising process depended on the permissive conditions of 
struggles for the state monopoly of violence. Ressentiment against European 
Jewry found its murderous expression in the Holocaust of Nazi mass killing 
and extermination camps only after Jews were constructed as complete 
outsiders defiling the purity of the national Kultur. In this case the dispersed 
means of violence of the failed Weimar state was replaced by the concentrated 
mobilisation of the means of violence by the Nazi state (Elias, 2013). The 
physical annihilation of outsider ethnic and national groups took place in 
particular ‘enclaves of atrocity’ where the target group could be isolated and 
concentrated and all self-restraint suspended as the killers underwent what 
de Swaan (2015: 125) calls ‘a regression in the service of the regime’. 
 
In the US, as Elias (2008: 215) notes, the state formation process placed 
significant means of violence under the control of a sub-group of the 
population, the white citizenry, and, except for wartime emergencies, 
systematically excluded another sub-group, the black citizenry, from a 
defensive share in the means of violence. One sub-group exercised life and 
death power over the other sub-group. To demonstrate the nature of the 
extreme power imbalance, Elias (2008) used Lee Harper’s novel To Kill A 
Mockingbird as a local case study of 1930s Alabama. Although the black 
character Tom Robinson accused of raping a white woman, Mayella Ewell, is 
patently innocent the white mob is nevertheless required to kill him. In their 
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eyes Robinson is guilty of symbolically offending white privilege: ‘the killing 
of a black man suspected of a sexual crime against a white woman was closely 
connected o with the loss of value felt by white men if they were unable to 
avenge the crime, real or imagined, by killing the person whom they held 
responsible for the deed’ (Elias, 2008: 227).  
 
Although the Robinson family represented the highest stratum of the black 
community while the Ewells were at the bottom of the white community, the 
social distance between them loomed like an abyss into which a black man 
could fall at any time. There was not even a pretence that the law would even-
handedly treat as a crime the murder of a black man since that would injure 
the self-worth of the established group and threaten to uncover the 
arbitrariness of symbolic privilege.  
 
Nor was the sectarian operation in Scotland as punitive, degrading, violent 
and systematic as the Penal Laws imposed on Ireland by the British state. 
Theodore Allen (2012) contends that the invention of ‘whiteness’ can be 
traced to the Protestant ascendency in post-1689 Ireland, a judgement already 
corroborated in 1792 by Edmund Burke. Burke called the systematic exclusion 
of Catholics from the privileges of state an ‘unparalleled code of oppression 
… manifestly the effects of national hatred and scorn towards a conquered 
people’ (Burke, 1792: 341). Burke was concerned that failures of British 
statecraft in Ireland, while subjugating the Catholic majority of the ‘plebian 
class’ under the ‘exclusive power’ of the Protestant minority, exercised ‘daily 
and hourly, an insulting and vexatious superiority’ in a ‘state of humiliating 
vassalage (often inverting the nature of things and relations)’ (1792: 334).  
 
By creating a sectarian form of Protestant rule, Britain therefore deprived 
itself of Catholics who might become members of the Irish landowning class 
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and mobilise the authority of property to restrain the mass of dispossessed 
Catholics from violent resistance, as threatened by the Protestant-led United 
Irishmen. Instead, Burke (1792: 332) worried that Ireland was ‘divided into 
two distinct bodies, without common interest, sympathy or connexion; one of 
which bodies was to possess all the franchises, all the property, all the 
education: The others were to be drawers of water and cutters of turf for 
them’. By using excessive violence over a long period to enforce Catholic 
oppression, Burke concluded, British rule had itself created the conditions for 
‘a mob’ to emerge that would resist the humiliation of dispossession using 
violent means ‘without temper, measure, or foresight’. When it finally came, 
the republican rebellion of 1798 was put down with savage state repression 
amidst civil war atrocities, while the British rulers manipulated a sectarian 
counter-revolution of the recently-formed Orange Order to divide Loyalist 
Protestants from Republican Presbyterians (Smyth, 2000). 
 
The increased integration into a national habitus of Catholics in Scotland may 
be more usefully compared to the situation of the Protestant minority in the 
Republic of Ireland. Protestants in the twenty-six counties were transformed 
from a formerly powerful established group into an outsider group in the 
midst of the vast Catholic majority. In this case, a former outsider group 
became the established national group: ‘To this day, in the Republic, both the 
minority Protestant community and the majority Catholic community are 
very conscious of the Protestants’ former status as a powerful established 
group’ (Mennell, et al, 2000: 76). As they exchanged positions, however, both 
sides absorbed attributes of the other group. Protestants became increasingly 
restrained about any lingering sense of moral superiority and even adopted 
some of the negative perceptions of the Protestant ascendancy long felt by 
Catholics, in part as cultural guilt for the past oppression of the majority by 




While bourgeois Protestants continue to enjoy economic power they suffered 
a grievous loss of social and political power as outsiders to the new power 
elite of the Irish state. A profound sense of ambivalence is experienced by the 
small Protestant minority seeking a public role in a state conditioned for 
much of its history by the influence of the Catholic church. As Protestants 
decline numerically and proportionately as ‘mixed marriages’ become more 
prevalent, community reproduction through endogamy becomes increasingly 
difficult to sustain. On the other hand, Catholics have become far more self-
critical of their own church and cultivate some of the civilising restraints 
exemplified by the Protestant minority.  
 
Clearly, the situation of the formerly dominant Protestant minority under the 
Irish state represents an inverse example to the formerly dominated Catholic 
minority in Scotland. More closer to the established-outsider relations in 
Scotland perhaps are the processes examined by Elias and Scotson (2008) by 
which two groups that resembled each other in almost all respects – white, 
working class, English, Christian –were nevertheless still divided into hostile 
groups on the arbitrary basis of how long they had lived in the area. Social 
images of other groups are formed by ‘an optical illusion’ , Elias argues:  
 
the images which the ‘established’, which powerful sections of a 
society have of themselves and communicate to others, tends to be 
modelled on ‘the minority of the best’; it inclines towards idealisation. 
The image of ‘outsiders’, of groups who have in relation to the 
established relatively little power, tends to be modelled on ‘the 
minority of the worst’, it inclines towards denigration. (Elias and 




A sense of superiority is defended all the more vehemently the longer it has 
been established as an inter-generational tradition using ‘almost everywhere 
the same weapons, among them humiliating gossip, stigmatising beliefs about 
the whole group modelled on observations of its worst section, degrading 
code words and, as far as possible, exclusion from all chances of power’ (Elias 
and Scotston, 2008: 158). 
 
In the case of a long, drawn-out group decline, however, temporary triumphs 
and a certain continuity in collective rituals, for instance around sport, 
parades or religion, allow the reality of the changing power-balance to be 
obscured or denied, despite the dwindling social stock of the group. This is 
not a linear process but a dynamic and uneven one. In the long-run the 
personal and group habitus is reformed by uneven and independent 
developments of locality, work, religion, family, education, politics, and 
nation. In such ways irrational bigotry has been compelled to recognise and 
trail the emerging but obdurate realities of modern Scottish society. Fantasy 
we-images – expressed as triumphalist chants by Rangers fans in the manner 
of ‘We are the People’ and ‘Simply the Best’ – merely heighten the seething 
but temporary resentments of football rivalries.  
 
On the other hand, the ressentiment expressed by official moral indignation for 
disinterested punishment is functionally reproduced by the established 
professional middle class in Scotland. Not only the fans but the club itself 
misrecognises its own changed position in the cultural field as a dominated 
institution, as when club resentments led to the banning of a BBC journalist 
for alleged biased reporting, inviting a boycott of the club’s ground in 
retaliation by the BBC, a more dominant institution. On the other hand, the 
declining institutional power of newspapers in west central Scotland finds it 
more difficult to protect the professional autonomy of journalists. In early 
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2016, the respected journalist Graham Spiers resigned from The Herald while 
columnist Angela Haggerty was fired from the Sunday Herald after the club 
complained to the newspaper management about the legality of reports of 
continuing bigotry among Rangers fans. Supported by the National Union of 
Journalists Haggerty was reinstated weeks later. Haggerty had been subject to 
what was described as a four-year long online campaign of anti-Irish racism 
after editing a book charting Ranger’s financial woes, leading to a conviction 
for religiously aggravated breach of the peace (Sunday Herald, 12 January 
2014). 
 
Wide variations in social distance and emotional intensity between 
established and outsider groups permitted by the state formation process 
indicates some of the difficulties associated with uniformly applying a ‘wages 
of whiteness’ approach from its original context to another one where it is 
has, at best, limited explanatory value. It also highlights the analytical value 
of the dynamic nature of the established-outsider model developed by Elias to 
account for the arbitrary valuations of group power imbalances at particular 
stages in the state formation process.  
 
Wither sectarianism? 
A linear model of escalating violence that informs so much of the justification 
for criminalising offensive conduct at football matches does not bear scrutiny. 
It is not the case that what Hannah Arendt called the ‘banality of evil’ festers 
at football grounds in Scotland among anonymous nobodies ever ready to 
engage in sectarian violence. Alongside Northern Ireland, Scotland is one of 
the few nations where the term ‘sectarianism’ is officially nominated as a 
fundamental social problem. Yet unlike Northern Ireland, Scotland has not 
experienced systematic discrimination against the democratic, civil and social 
rights of a minority religion or nationality, their forced territorial segregation, 
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the formation of paramilitary groups, and decades of anti-state and sectarian 
violence. Despite the absence of systematic inter-communal segregation, 
however, public concern about ‘sectarianism’ has not faded away as might be 
expected but has instead become a leading political, legal and academic 
discourse (Law, 2016).  
 
Given the gap between the limited experience and widespread perceptions of 
‘sectarianism’, the term itself does not merely describe some pre-existing 
phenomenon (Kelly, 2011). Legitimate processes of nomination and 
classification by governmental authority help to construct what it aims to 
punish and reform. Institutional and legal measures were introduced to target 
sectarianism as a failure to adapt to the civilising national habitus. 
‘Sectarianism’ carries an emotional and ideological charge that labels some 
social relations as irrational and ‘mindless’ implying that others are civilised 
and ‘mindful’ or reasonable. Populist terminology like ‘sectarianism’ needs to 
be submitted to the critical analysis of long-run changes in social relations 
between groups, including the interest in disinterest of governmental power 
to name, classify and punish. 
 
Rather than reify groups as things in themselves a more adequate sociological 
approach concentrates on the changing power dynamics of social relations. A 
shift in the power-balance has occurred such that any continuing sense of 
polar opposition between singular Protestant and Catholic ‘communities’ as 
the cultural basis of sectarianism fails to register the reality of long-run 
sociological processes, the role of governmental nomination, and the moral 
indignation of disinterested, self-restrained middle class professionals. When 
a phenomenon such as sectarianism is nominated officially as a ‘problem’ and 
neither governmental regulation nor self-regulation are perceived to be able 
to exercise control or restraint over recalcitrant subjects, a sociology of 
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ressentiment compels the state to assume external powers to address the 
situation. The legitimate nomination of illegitimate names requires the force 
of a moral indignation that operates under the guise of disinterested 
punishment.  
 
Uncovering the social sources of sectarianism therefore depends on 
establishing the relational processes of symbolic communication that 
constructs sectarianism as a phenomena that so alarms ‘the public’. 
Unfortunately, the focus has been less on media, legal and political 
constructions and omissions of sectarianism as moral indignation demanding 
disinterested punishment. Instead, the central focus has been on the 
decivilised outsiders of male working class football fans and the threat that 
they present to the symbolic and physical integrity of ‘the community’. In this 
sense, sectarianism has been described as a ‘social anxiety’ that arises from the 
disjuncture between general perception and individual experience (Rosie, 
2015: 330). However, sociology needs to identify the changing power dynamic 
that names and classifies the unfounded perceptions of the public and 
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